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This Article examines the nature and regulation of religious coercion. Direct
religious coercion denotes situations where the government expressly applies
sanctions to ensure conformity with religious goals. Indirect religious coercion
describes situations where, although the state may not have intended to pressure
citizens to comply with or participate in some religious activity, it nonetheless
takes advantage of social, psychological or peer pressure that has the same
conformity-inducing effect. Indirect religious coercion is a real problem for those
who dissent from majoritarian religious practices. But an open-ended inquiry
into it can, as critics point out, be a highly unpredictable and subjective exercise.
On balance, the Article concludes that the concept does deserve recognition by
the courts. The Article develops a modified indirect coercion test to guide judges
in First Amendment cases. A two-step test is expounded to streamline the inquiry,
identify the key criteria, and render the test more workable.
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"No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice."
"Let there be no coercion in religion." 2
INTRODUCTION
To ask, "What is religious coercion?" is a demanding question, akin to
asking, "What is religious freedom?" This is because religious coercion is the
antithesis of religious freedom.3 Defining precisely what is "coercion" is an
exercise that continues to tax philosophers. To take but one definition,
"[cloercion occurs when one person threatens to visit some evil or unwanted
consequence on another unless that other does or refrains from doing some act
in accordance with the coercer's demands."5 Rather than laboriously work
through the subject again from scratch,6 it will suffice for present purposes to
posit an initial working definition of religious coercion as: the application of, or
threat of, force by the coercer to ensure someone, the coerced person (or
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc.
E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 175.
2. QUR'AN 2:256.
3. "Th[e right to religious] freedom means that all men are to be immune from
coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise
that in matters religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own
beliefs." Vatican II Council, Declaration on Religious Freedom (1965), reprinted in THE
DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN 11675, 678-79 (Walter M. Abbott ed., 1966) [hereinafter Vatican].
4. See, e.g., NoMos XVI: COERCION (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1972); Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE & METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ERNEST NAGEL 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969); ALAN S. ROSENBAUM,
COERCION AND AUTONOMY: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, ISSUES, AND PRACTICES (1986);
ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987); COERCION AND THE STATE (David A. Reidy & Walter
J. Riker eds., 2008).
5. Burton M. Leiser, On Coercion, in COERCION AND THE STATE 31, 31 (David A.
Reidy & Walter J. Riker eds., 2008).
6. Fortunately this has been done. For a most rigorous and lucid analysis of the core
elements of coercion, see Peter Westen, 'Freedom' and 'Coercion'- Virtue Words and Vice
Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 559-69 (defining coercion as "a constraint or promise of a
constraint, Y, that X, knowingly brings to bear on X in order that X choose to do something,
Z;, that X would not otherwise do and that X does not wish to be constrained to do-where X
knows that X, is bringing or promising to bring Y to bear on him for that purpose, where Y
renders X's doing Z, more eligible to X than Z, would otherwise be, and where Y leaves X
worse off either than he otherwise expects to be or than he ought to be for refusing to do X;'s
bidding.").
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coercee), engages in (or refrains from engaging in) a particular religious7
practice, observance, ceremony or ritual.
Notice in this definition, the identification of the coercer is left open.
Definitions of religious coercion typically talk about compulsion, force or
power exercised by the state or by others. There is no doubt that religious
coercion may be exerted by non-state actors-employers, unions, churches,
clubs, neighbors, parents, relatives, friends 9-upon other citizens or groups of
citizens. If one believes that authentic faith must be free and voluntary,o then it
may seem myopic to focus upon government coercion in religious matters and
not coercion by non-government actors. This is a fair criticism. However,
constitutional bills of rights typically have a "vertical" focus and are aimed
curbing excesses of government power exercised towards citizens." Thus,
some form of state action is required before the conduct at issue can be
scrutinized as a constitutional violation. Secondly, the extent to which the state
ought to intervene to protect one group of vulnerable citizens from religious
pressure exercised by another such group is simply beyond the scope of this
Article-save in one situation that I shall come to shortly. Conceivably, the
state's duty to protect the religious freedom of its citizens could require it in
some circumstances to intervene. 12 The obvious example is a law to prevent
disturbance or interruption at places of worship.13 The focus of this essay,
however, is religious coercion exercised or authorized by the state.
In Part I, I outline the two conceptions of religious coercion, direct and
indirect. In Parts II and III respectively, I examine the case against and for legal
recognition of indirect religious coercion. Part IV contains an assessment of the
pros and cons of adopting the indirect coercion approach and concludes in
favor of the law recognizing the concept. Part V sets out a modified indirect
coercion test. My goal here is to ensure the benefits of scrutinizing the practical
7. On what constitutes a "religious" versus a philosophical, patriotic or moral practice,
see infra notes 159-173 and accompanying text.
8. See Vatican, supra note 3 ("[C]oercion on the part of individuals or of social groups
and of any human power .... ).
9. H. J. McCloskey, Coercion: Its Nature and Significance, 18 S.J. PHIL. 335, 343
(1980).
10. See, e.g., Vatican, supra note 3, at 689-70 ("It is one of the major tenets of Catholic
doctrine that man's response to God in faith must be free. Therefore no one is to be forced to
embrace the Christian faith against his own will. . . . The act of faith is of its very nature a
free act. Man . . . cannot give his adherence to God revealing Himself unless the Father
draw him to offer to God the reasonable and free submission of faith.").
11. See, e.g., Paul Rishworth, Liberty, Equality and the New Establishment, in
LITIGATING RIGHTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 97 (Grant
Huscroft & Paul Rishworth eds., 2002) ("The orthodoxy, of course, is that bills of rights are
designed to limit the power of government for the benefit of private persons and
institutions.").
12. See REx AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 176-84
(2005).
13. See id. at 363.
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social pressure that majoritarian religionists exert upon adherents of religious
minorities are not dissipated by an unpredictable, open-ended inquiry.
Accordingly, I propound a test that narrows the inquiry sufficiently to give it a
greater degree of administrability and predictability. I conclude that indirect
religious coercion is worth proscribing, provided a focused inquiry is followed.
I. Two CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS COERCION
From the case law we can identify two distinct conceptions of religious
coercion, one narrow and one broad. 14
First, there is direct or legal religious coercion. This denotes overt, express,
explicit, or blatant pressure exercised by the state upon individuals to engage in
(or not engage in) matters religious. It is "legal" in nature as there is the express
threat of a legal penalty, sanction, fine or the threat of withdrawal of a state
benefit for non-compliance. It is "direct" because the government is
intentionally and openly confronting the person with a choice of conforming to
the religious activity in question or facing the adverse consequences imposed
by the state. There are just two parties involved: the coercer and the coerced.
The second type is "indirect" religious coercion where the state uses an
intermediary or third party to achieve its objective. Indirect religious coercion
comprises less overt and more "subtle" kinds of social, peer or psychological
pressure by private persons upon other private individuals to engage in (or not
engage in) matters religious. There is, with this second form of religious
coercion, no legal sanction imposed by the state for non-compliance.
Furthermore, the choice to conform or not with the religious conduct is in a
strict, formal sense, voluntary.
This situation appears at first glance to be an instance of purely private
religious coercion and it is difficult to see how the state has coerced citizens to
support or participate in religion. Nonetheless, the argument goes, the state may
still be implicated where one can discern a causal link between the state and the
ostensibly private exercise of coercion. 5 While the state may not have directly
applied pressure, it may have "orchestrate[d]"16 or relied upon social pressure
to ensure conformity to some religious matter. This is wrong, as "the
government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may
use more direct means."17 Here there are three parties involved: the coercer, the
intermediary and the coerced person.
My prime focus is not the situation where the government intentionally and
actively co-opts private intermediaries as its agent to bring pressure to bear.
14. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
15. See generally, Cynthia V. Ward, Coercion and Choice under the Establishment
Clause, 39 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1621, 1649 (2006).
16. Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 406 (4th Cir. 2005).
17. Lee, 505 U.S. at 594.
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This is non-contentious for it is just another species of direct coercion, but it is
not the phenomenon at issue. Rather, I am concerned with situations where this
was not the original or principal objective but, nevertheless, the state becomes
aware of the "collateral damage" its policy is now causing. It belatedly
becomes aware that it has "structured an environment" were social pressure is
having a coercive effect upon some citizens and having done so "the State
cannot disclaim its responsibility for those resulting pressures."18
Indirect religious coercion theory says the government cannot use an
intermediary to bring about its goal or-and this is the crux-blithely allow the
same result to occur having creating a situation where the prospect of a person
being coerced to participate by (non-state) actors is a real and foreseeable one.
Having so structured the situation it would be wrong to simply "let peer
pressure take its natural and predictable course."19 Plainly, the government
cannot expressly say: engage in this religious activity or suffer the penalty.
Neither, according to the indirect religious coercion theory, should the state
create or mandate a situation where the person being coerced is confronted with
a technical choice to not engage in a religious activity, but this choice is
illusory due to the presence of social or peer pressure exerted by intermediaries.
In the Establishment Clause case law the distinction is firmly
recognized,20 although there has been a debate among the Supreme Court
justices on the wisdom of extending the notion of religious coercion beyond
direct legal coercion to include indirect forms of religious coercion.21
To reiterate, this essay seeks to clarify these two kinds of religious
coercion and, in particular, to explore whether indirect religious coercion is a
workable and helpful notion for legal purposes.
A. Direct Religious Coercion
A straightforward understanding of religious coercion is legal coercion-
religious practice or observance enforced by the threat of legal sanction by the
state. The Human Rights Committee in its authoritative General Comment No.
22 upon Article 18.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1966 ("No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to
have a religion or belief of his choice") take this approach to the meaning of
coercion:
Article 18.2 bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt
a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or
18. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 269 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring).
19. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 47 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
20. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660-61 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992); Santa Fe Ind.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-12 (2000). See generally Ward, supra note 15.
21. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 577. But see id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their
religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or
to convert. Policies or practices having the same intention or effect,
such as, for example, those restricting access to education, medical
care, employment or the rights guaranteed by article 25 and other
provisions of the Covenant, are similarly inconsistent with article
18.2.22
Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting in Lee v. Weisman, has been a consistent
advocate of the direct legal coercion approach: "The coercion that was a
hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious
orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty."23
Lee is one of the many cases where the conduct at issue was public prayer.24
The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for a rabbi to offer non-
sectarian, generically theistic, invocation and benediction prayers at Rhode
Island, middle school and high school graduation ceremonies. 25 The prayers
were not rendered lawful by the fact that attendance at the graduation was
voluntary in a legal sense.26
Justice Clarence Thomas in the Pledge of Allegiance case, Elk Grove,
strongly endorsed Justice Scalia's strict definition. 27 He argued that the broader
notion of indirect, subtle coercion (to be discussed shortly) adopted in cases
such as Lee "cannot be defended"28 and "has no basis in law or reason." 29
Justice O'Connor in Elk Grove pinpointed "compulsion. . . of the direct sort"30
and instances where the government "overtly coerce[s] a person,"3' as the
proper focus.
What are examples of direct coercion? Taxation to support a state church,
compelling attendance at a state church and requiring a religious oath to obtain
government office are historic instances. 32 The Human Rights Committee
mentions the deprivation of state educational or medical benefits for non-
22. General Comment No. 22, 5. UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.4 (1993). See
also, PAUL M. TAYLOR, FREEDOM OF RELIGION: UN AND EUROPEAN RIGHTs LAW AND
PRACTICE, 46-47 (2005); Peter Radan, Chapter 1: International Law and Religion: Article 18
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in LAW AND RELIGION: GOD,
STATE, AND THE COMMON LAW, 9-27 (Peter Radan, et al. eds., 2005). The US ratified the
ICCPR on June 8, 1992.
23. 505 U.S. at 640.
24. Id. at 581.
25. Id. at 599.
26. Id. at 586, 595.
27. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49. (Thomas, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 45.
29. Id. at 49.
30. Id. at 44. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Lee, 505 U.S. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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compliance as further examples. 3 3
A good contemporary example are the cases concerning religiously-
oriented substance abuse treatment programs run for prisoners.34 For instance,
in Kerr v. Farrey,35 James Kerr, an inmate at a Wisconsin state minimum-
security facility, was subject to significant penalties if he refused to attend
religion-based narcotics rehabilitation meetings. Specifically, he would be
classified to a higher security risk category and adverse notations on his prison
record would be entered that could affect his eligibility for parole.36 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the state had impermissibly coerced
him to participate in a religious program.3 7 Similarly, in Inouye v. Kemna, the
plaintiff "had long objected to compelled participation in religion-based drug
treatment programs." Ricky Inouye had sued prison officials in the past
regarding his placement in Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous
while in prison and taken steps to avoid such religion-based programs while on
parole. Prior to his release on parole, he sent a letter to the Hawaiian state
parole authority objecting to being placed in such programs as a condition of
his parole, stating that he was Buddhist and enclosing a copy of the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Kerr. The court concluded that his rights had been violated
by being forced to chose between returning to prison or attending a religious-
based drug treatment program. The court commented: "While we in no way
denigrate the fine work of AA/NA, attendance in their programs may not be
coerced by the state. The Hobson's choice Nanamori [the parole officer]
offered Inouye-to be imprisoned or to renounce his own religious beliefs-
offends the core of Establishment Clause jurisprudence." 39
Another illustration is Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs Association v. Clarke.40
The Milwaukee County Sheriff had invited a local Evangelical church's
33. General Comment, supra note 22.
34. For cases concerning religious-based substance abuse programs for prisoners where
the courts ruled there was no religious coercion, usually on the basis that the plaintiff raised
no objection before or during his participation in the program, see, e.g., Bumight v. Sisto,
No. CIV S-08-1894, 2011 WL 533979, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2010) (finding an
allegation of denial of parole due to failure to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous program
unfounded); Sanders v. Swarthout, 09-cv-3303, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17646, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 23, 2011) (finding no evidence prisoner was coerced to participate in Alcoholics
Anonymous program); Goodwin v. Hamilton, 10-cv- 1909, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25790,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. March 14, 2011) (finding no evidence prisoner was coerced to participate
in Narcotics and Alcoholics Anonymous program).
35. 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996).
36. Id. at 474.
37. Id.
38. 504 F.3d 705, 709 (9th Cir. 2007). A violation of the plaintiffs religious freedom
was similarly found in Hanas v. Inner City Christian Outreach, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 683
(2008), where a Catholic offender faced incarceration unless he attended Bible studies and
followed the worship directives of the Pentecostal rehabilitation program.
39. Inouye, 504 F.3d at 714.
40. 513 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
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organization, the Fellowship of Christian Centurions, to make presentations at
the Department's occasional leadership conferences, as well as at the
Department's daily "roll call" meetings at the start of each work shift.41 The
plaintiffs, two deputies who were Muslim and Catholic, objected to what was
an indisputably religious message presented on these occasions, as well as to
the religious literature distributed. The District Court held that the Department
had engaged in "religious proselytizing."42 Attendance at the conferences and
roll calls was mandatory and the Department did not advise them of, nor
provide any opportunity for, the deputies to excuse themselves.43 Before the
leadership conference the Department had rather pointedly discussed promotion
criteria. The deputies had been coerced to participate, or at least remain present,
at these religious presentations for fear of losing their jobs or being stymied in
their career.
B. Indirect Religious Coercion
A more subtle and broader understanding of coercion takes into account
the psychological, social, or peer pressure a person may experience if he or she
does not comply. Whilst not under any legal penalty, the person may feel they
have little real choice not to engage in the conduct expected.
In a long line of Establishment Clause casesj 4 judges have criticized state-
approved practices that involve "subtle coercive pressures" 45 to engage in some
religious practice. In Engel v. Vitale, a nondenominational voluntary prayer
said by the class at the start of each school day at a New York public school
was struck down as a violation of the Establishment Clause.46 The majority of
the Supreme Court stated:
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend
upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws
operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not. . . . When the
power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. 47
In Lee v. Weisman, the majority of the Supreme Court insisted that "public
pressure, as well as peer pressure, ... though subtle and indirect, can be as real
41. Id. at 1016-17.
42. Id. at 1019.
43. Id. at 1021.
44. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992);
Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). See generally, Mark Strasser, The
Coercion Test: On Prayer, Offense, and Doctrinal Inculcation, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 417
(2009).
45. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588.
46. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-31.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
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as any overt compulsion." 48
The Court accompanied the expanded notion of coercion with an expanded
(and similarly contested) meaning of "support" or "participation" in a religious
activity. Conceivably, the objector to the prayer could sit or stand in silence
during the invocation, thereby signifying mere respect for the prayer, rather
than participation or assent. But the Court saw it otherwise: "What matters is
that, given our social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could
believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval of
it." 49 The dissenter is coerced into appearing to subscribe to a religious activity
he or she does not agree with.
Justice Scalia dissented forcefully on this point:
The Court's notion that a student who simply sits in "respectful silence"
during the invocation and benediction (when all others are standing) has
somehow joined-or would somehow be perceived as having joined-in the
prayers is nothing short of ludicrous. We indeed live in a vulgar age. But
surely "our social conventions" . . . have not coarsened to the point that
anyone who does not stand on his chair and shout obscenities can reasonably
50be deemed to have assented to everything said in his presence.
Even a student who was standing would not have been justified in
believing that this action signified her own participation or approval. For
Justice Scalia, standing "[would] not remotely establish a 'participation' (or an
'appearance of participation') in a religious exercise." 5 ' Rather, he contended,
it would be equally consistent with respect for the religious observances of
others.
The Supreme Court in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe found
similar indirect coercion at work in a Texas high school's student-led prayer
52delivered before a home football game. While attendance at a football game
was technically voluntary, and not as compelling an event as a one-off
graduation ceremony, the Court held that in a practical, cultural sense it was
involuntary.5 3 For some pupils, such as the direct participants-the football
54
players, cheerleaders and band members-attendance was required. But even
for the greater student body, it would be unrealistic to say that students did "not
feel immense social pressure . .. to be involved in the extracurricular event that
is American high school football.",5 Thus, the prayer had "the improper effect
of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship."56
48. 505 U.S. at 593.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 638.
52. 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000).
53. Id. at 311-12.
54. Id. at 311.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 312.
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In Elk Grove, the majority of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals drew upon
Lee and Santa Fe in ruling that the elementary public school policy requiring
57teacher-led daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance was coercive. Given
that the Pledge uses the words "under God," students were effectively coerced
to participate in an exercise with religious content: choosing to refrain would
risk disapproval from their teachers and backlash by their peers.58 Although the
Supreme Court was not required to rule on the merits of the Establishment
Clause violation, Justice Thomas agreed that if the Court's broad understanding
of coercion in Lee was the ruling precedent, then the Pledge was
unconstitutional.59 The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed this finding of coercive
effect.60
II. THE CASE AGAINST INDIRECT RELIGIOUS COERCION
There appear to be no dissenters to the proposition that direct religious
coercion is impermissible. But is indirect religious coercion the kind of
coercion that courts should be concerned with? There are at least three distinct
objections to the concept.
A. Administratively Unworkable
Some are adamant that, in light of the confusing case law on indirect
coercion to date, the courts are ill-equipped to delve into slippery questions of
psychological coercion.6 1 The concept is yet another species of "constitutional
Rorschach test," 62 another "weasel word." 63 Justice Scalia in Lee v. Weisman
57. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 486-87 (9th Cir. 2003).
58. Id. at 488.
59. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 46 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). As we have seen, however, he believed that Lee was wrongly decided and the
broader notion of indirect coercion was unsustainable.
60. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) ("We
agree that the students in elementary schools are being coerced to listen to the other students
recite the Pledge. They may even feel induced to recite the Pledge themselves. Although the
School District's Policy does not compel them to recite the Pledge, or even to listen to others
reciting the Pledge, we recognize that elementary school children are unlikely to walk out of
the classroom in protest.").
61. See, e.g., Steven Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REV. 463, 467; L. Scott Smith, From Typology to Synthesis: Recasting the
Jurisprudence of Religion, 34 CAP. U. L. REv. 51 (2005); Mark Strasser, The Coercion Test:
On Prayer, Offense, and Doctrinal Inculcation, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 417 (2009).
62. Gey, supra note 61, at 467, is applying this pejorative description to the much-
maligned three-part Lemon test for Establishment Clause violations (Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)) not the coercion test.
63. L. Scott Smith, Religion Interfacing with Law and Politics: Three Tired Ideas in
the Jurisprudence ofReligion, 10 LOGOS 14, 21 (2007).
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was at his caustic best in his denunciation of the notion.6 He accused the
majority of wielding "the bulldozer of its social engineering" by "invent[ing] a
boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion.", 5
Reflecting upon the public nativity display cases which had come, to quote the
words of another judge, to "requir[e] scrutiny more commonly associated with
interior decorators than with the judiciary,"66 Justice Scalia continued, "But
interior decorating is a rock-hard science compared to psychology practiced by
amateurs."67 There was, in Justice Scalia's view, no room for a kind of judicial
"psycho-journey,"68 adding:
I see no warrant for expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by
threat of penalty-a brand of coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to
those of us who have made a career of reading the disciples of Blackstone
rather than of Freud.69
The majority had seen itself as engaging in a "delicate and fact-sensitive"70
approach in its utilization of the concept of psychological coercion. But Justice
Scalia doubted whether the Court fully grasped the complexities and subtleties
of this phenomenon.71 A few sporadic citations of articles from the
psychological literature could not, in his view, "disguise the fact that the Court
ha[d] gone beyond the realm where judges know what they are doing. The
Court's argument that state officials ha[d] 'coerced' students to take part in the
invocation and benediction at graduation ceremonies [was], not to put too fine a
point on it, incoherent." 72
B. Over-Inclusive Coverage and Secularizing Effect
The adoption of the concept of indirect religious coercion in anti-
establishment cases has had adverse consequences for religious expression in
the public square. An increasing number of traditional, historic public
religious displays and ceremonies have been successfully challenged due to the
courts' acceptance of the argument that there is a subtle coercive effect upon
64. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 632. See also, Smith, supra note 63, at 26 ("the notion of coercion is simply
the term that judges and other citizens use to describe what happens whenever the state
adopts religious and moral values with which they disagree. Constraints that are disliked are
coercive."')
66. Am. Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (quoted in Lee, 505 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
67. Lee, 505 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 643.
69. Id. at 642.
70. Id. at 597 (majority opinion).
71. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. At least that is the view of some leading commentators. See, e.g., STEPHEN CARTER,
THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 122-23 (1993).
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those citizens who do not share that faith. 74 In most Western nations, the
predominant religious observances and rituals tend to be Christian-a result of
the historic predominance of Christianity in the West.
Public displays that are not directly and legally coercive are, nonetheless,
constitutionally suspect under an indirect religious coercion approach because
they are said to send an alienating and exclusionary signal to citizens who do
not share that religion.75 These signals may encourage some dissenters to
conform to majoritarian religious practices. But the real objection is surely not
that some citizens are coerced to conform; more often than not the dissenter
stands his ground.76 It is in the nature of things that some will be more
courageous than others. Furthermore, coercion is not always successful, but
that does not mean that the coercer has not exercised coercion. 77 "To coerce a
person is to subject him to coercive constraint, regardless of whether the
constraint achieves its purpose."78 At the very least one can charge the coercer
with an attempt to coerce.79
Arguably, the real concern behind the alienating-signal objection is not so
much that some may be coerced but that the state is not acting neutrally or
even-handedly in singling out certain religious communities for special
74. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (upholding an injunction
against a Kentucky courthouse display of Ten Commandments, challenged as violating the
Establishment Clause); Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2010)
(holding roadside crosses marking slain police officers to be unconstitutional); Trunk v. San
Diego, 629 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding the display of a large cross on Mt. Soledad
unconstitutional). Admittedly, the tide is not one-way and some religious displays and
landmarks have survived Establishment Clause challenges: see, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry,
545 U.S. 677 (2005) (finding a Ten Commandments monument on Texas State Capitol lawn
upheld to be constitutional); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (finding
a Ten Commandments monument in Utah City Park to be constitutional); Salazar v. Buono,
130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (failing to find a Latin cross in Mojave National Park
unconstitutional). See also, Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Displays:
Transparent Rationalizations and Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1211 (2011).
75. The alienation-signal concern is most associated with Justice O'Connor's
"endorsement" test, first announced in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) and
reiterated most recently by her in Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33-45
(2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring). On the alienation objection and endorsement test, see
REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 139-42 (2005).
76. Indeed it may be patronizing to assume that most meekly succumb. One
commentator, criticizing the courts treatment of indirect coercion, charges that the courts'
implicit assessment of the complainants rests upon the "patronizing[] ... assum[ption] that
whatever . .. oppositional views that [they] may hold . .. are so fragile and weakly supported
that the prayer is sufficient to overwhelm their volition and to induce in them a response
contrary to their own belief." L. Scott Smith, Religion Interfacing with Law and Politics:
Three Tired Ideas in the Jurisprudence of Religion, 10 LOGOS 14, 25 (2007).
77. See Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in NOMOS XIV: CoERCION (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972); McCloskey, supra note 9, at 344.
78. Peter Westen, 'Freedom' and 'Coercion'-Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985
DUKE L.J. 541, 562.
79. McCloskey, supra note 9, at 344.
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treatment. Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager contend that the real
80
objection to public school prayer rituals and the like is their social meaning.
Implicit is a blunt message: "[t]he real members of this community (the school
community, and by extension the larger community serviced by the school or
school district) are practicing Christians of a certain sort; others dwell among
us but lack the status of full membership."81 These practices "create a class of
outsiders and thereby disparage those relegated to that status." 82 A
constitutional wrong is committed even if students can avoid the ritual and are
not directly coerced to participate.
C. The De Minimis Principle and the Standard for Judging Coercion
Critics of the indirect coercion approach argue that allegations of
exclusion, embarrassment, stigma or alienation are properly caught by the de
minimis non curat lex principle (the law does not concern itself with trifles).
Some critics would say that the outer limit of coercion was reached, if not
breached, when the majority of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in early
rounds of the Elk Grove litigation held the Pledge of Allegiance to be
coercive. Even though the school pupil was not obliged to recite the pledge,
she was compelled to watch and listen to the ritual: "the mere presence in the
classroom every day as peers recite[d] the statement 'one nation under God'
ha[d] a coercive effect." 84 The policy "impermissibly coerce[d] a religious
act."85 Judge Fernandez, dissenting, believed it was "obvious" that the tendency
of the Pledge's "under God" phrase to establish religion in the United States, or
to interfere with the free exercise (or non-exercise) of religion, was de
minimis. There was, he believed, no coercion of anyone's religious liberty
"except in the fevered eye of persons who most fervently would like to drive all
tincture of religion out of the public life of our polity."87 Subsequently, the
Ninth Circuit has held that the Pledge of Allegiance is constitutional, but
importantly for this present discussion, the finding of coercion was affirmed.88
Admittedly it is no response to say glibly that an aggrieved citizen should
simply be less sensitive, have a thicker skin, or be made of sterner stuff. In
80. See generally RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007).
81. Id. at 163.
82. Compare id. with Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33-45
(2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466,488 (9th Cir. 2003).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 487.
86. Id. at 493 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 492.
88. See Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010).
For the majority, however, this was coercion of a patriotic activity, not coercion of a
religious activity. Id.
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Lee, the majority rejected the argument that the embarrassment and intrusion
suffered by the pupils was of a de minimis character.89 This issue highlights a
recurrent question in discussions of coercion in the law in general: what is the
standard by which the response of the coerced person is to be judged? Is it the
actual coerced person's susceptibility to the religious pressure or is it the
average or reasonable person in his or her position?90 It is, as Wertheimer
comments on standards for assessing coercion in law generally, "not clear
which approach is preferable" 9 1-a subjective or individualized test versus an
objective or standardized one. In the religious context, there might be a case for
leaning in favor of a subjective approach based on the individual's actual
response. Those subjected to religious pressure are almost invariably dissenters
from, or at least non-members of, the majoritarian religion. If the reasonable
average person in that situation-neither especially courageous nor timid-
would not succumb to pressure and conform, that might simply reflect the fact
that this person is a member of that faith already or has been socialized by the
dominant religion to acquiesce to or feel indifference toward such things.
Of course, subjective protestations of coercion that do not square with the
objective likelihood of such may not be given much credence. This perhaps
explains Chaudhuri v. Tennessee.92 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
refused to find there had been indirect coercion where Dr. Philip Chaudhuri, a
professor of mechanical engineering and a Hindu, challenged the practice of
prayers at Tennessee State University functions, including graduations. 93 "By
no stretch of the imagination" was the professor coerced to attend the functions,
given that attendance by faculty was not mandatory, attendance was not
monitored, and no faculty member had been penalized for non-attendance. 94
Compared to Lee, continued the Court, "[w]e may safely assume that doctors of
philosophy are less susceptible to religious indoctrination than children are."95
III. THE REJOINDER
A. More "Realistic"
Defenders of indirect religious coercion argue that it addresses the practical
reality of situation.
It might be that philosophers are unanimous that the coerced person does
89. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992).
90. Matthew Peterson, The Supreme Court's Coercion Test: Insufficient Constitutional
Protection for America's Religious Minorities, II CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 245, 266
(2001).
91. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 273 (1987).
92. 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997).
93. Id. at 233.
94. Id. at 239.
95. Id.
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have a choice and the response is voluntary.96 "To say a person has been
'coerced' into doing something presupposes an act of will on his part." 97 "A
person being coerced has a choice between acquiescence or resistance to the
coercer's demands, even though the unpleasant consequences of failure to
acquiesce might be highly probable or even a dead certainty."9 8
There are situations where philosophers agree that it is correct to say a
person is forced to do something against his will and that the action is
involuntary, namely, where the force is an overwhelming external physical
force upon which one has no control (a hurricane) or an overpowering natural
person (a deranged madman who clasps the hand of the person holding a gun,
forcing her to pull the trigger).99 These instances of true involuntary action or
acts against one's will-it might be better to dub these "compulsion"'oo-are
rare and not the kind of situation we are addressing here. The sorts of coercion
we are concerned with are those where the person acts and is not acted upon,
where they reluctantly choose to do something they would prefer not to:
[T]he coerced person acts. He does what he does as a result of coercion. He
may well not like doing what he does and may much prefer to act in other
ways; and he may do what he does only because he is coerced. Nonetheless,
he, the coerced person does what he does; he chooses to do it.10 1
Even if, according to the refined strictures of philosophy, the person does
exercise choice and the conduct is technically voluntary and not against her
will, this does not dispose of the matter so far as the law is concerned. There
may be effective compulsion of citizens even if there is no overwhelming or
irresistible pressure to contend with. The "real altemative[s]" open to the
complainant must, it is contended, be addressed.102 In Lee v. Weisman, the
middle school graduation prayer case, the majority commented:
Attendance may not be required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a
student is not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise in any real
sense of the term "voluntary" .... The prayer exercises in this case are
especially improper because the State has in every practical sense compelled
attendance and participation in an explicit religious exercise at an event of
singular importance to every student, one the objecting student had no real
96. Bayles, Coercion, supra note 77; McCloskey, Nature and Significance, supra note
9; Burton M. Leiser, On Coercion, in COERCION AND THE STATE 31, 33 (David A. Reidy &
Walter J. Riker eds., 2008); Michael R. Rhodes, The Nature of Coercion, 34 J. VALUE
INQUIRY 369, 370 (2000).
97. Westen, supra note 6, at 565.
98. Leiser, supra note 5, at 33.
99. See Bayles, supra note 77, at 18; McCloskey, supra note 9, at 336.
100. Leiser, supra note 5, at 33. Bayles calls this type "occurrent" coercion to
distinguish it from "dispositional" coercion, the latter denoting the choice between
unpalatable alternatives. Bayles, supra note 77, at 18.
101. McCloskey, supra note 9, at 336.
102. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992).
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alternative to avoid. 0 3
Recognition of the reality of subtle or indirect coercion in religious matters
is said to avoid the "formalism" of the direct religious coercion approach. 04
"[T]o say", said the Court in Lee, "a teenage student has a real choice not to
attend her high school graduation is formalistic in the extreme." 05 Steven Gey
describes the invidious choice confronting school pupils such as "Jane"
Newdow and Deborah Weisman 0 6 this way:
He or she may silently accept the government-sanctioned religious exercise,
thereby suppressing deep disagreement with the exercise and misleading the
rest of society about the dissenter's true views. Alternatively, the dissenter
may make an overt gesture of dissent, which will be perceived by virtually
everyone as inappropriate, rude, inflammatory, and probably sacrilegious,
thereby increasing the dissenter's feelings of ostracism and the psychological
pressure to conform.107
Similarly, Judge Reinhardt, dissenting in Newdow v. Rio Linda School
District, described it this way:
[R]ather than label himself an oddball, a troublemaker, and an outcast, rather
than subject himself to humiliating name calling, harassment and derision, he
may simply prefer to conform, formally pledging his adherence to a religious
belief that is antithetical to his true philosophical views. For these children
who conform unwillingly, coercion has had its effect: They have chosen to
forego their constitutional rights rather than to face the consequences of not
108doing so.
Some philosophers are reluctant to say that social pressure or public
opinion may coerce. 0 9 Coercion is "an interpersonal phenomenonl10 that
103. Id. at 595, 598 (emphasis added).
104. See id. at 595; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000)
(quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 595).
105. Lee, 505 U.S. at 595. And perhaps it is formalistic to say even adult citizens, such
as licensed Texas lawyer Thomas Van Orden, who regularly pass by the six-foot-high red
granite Ten Commandments monument erected on the lawn of the state capitol, Van Orden
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), are immune from coercive pressures too.
106. Or, at least their fathers. Daniel Weisman, "[a]cting for himself and his daughter,"
objected to any prayers at fourteen-year-old Deborah's middle school graduation. Lee, 505
U.S. at 581. The Rev. Dr. Michael Newdow, an atheist and ordained minister of the
Universal Life Church, objected to his five-year-old daughter's exposure at kindergarten to
the Pledge of Allegiance. Greg Lucas, Atheist Dad Ready for Date at Top Court, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 22, 2004, at Al. The (unnamed) daughter herself, was, according to her
mother, a Christian who did not object to saying the Pledge. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). The Supreme Court held that as he was the non-custodial
parent, he lacked standing to sue on her behalf. Id.
107. Gey, supra note 61, at 503-04.
108. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
109. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 9, at 339.
110. Rhodes, supra note 96, at 372; see also Bayles, supra note 77, at 19; Westen,
supra note 6, at 560; LEISER, supra note 5, at 33.
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requires both coercer and coercee to be "persons"-either natural or juridical
(such as corporations, churches or the government). Natural forces such as
impending storms or lightning might compel people to act in a certain way but,
as noted above, they cannot sensibly be said to engage in coercion.111 The
amorphous thing called "social pressure" seems equally suspect as the coercive
agent. One reply would be to say that the intermediary is that collectively of
natural persons we call society: it is real humans exercising the pressure to
comply. Another would be that we are not talking about indiscriminate and
diffuse social pressure in general, but a particular, localized, and discrete
instance of it (such as a school or council meeting). Even if, however, there is a
clear distinction between coercion (personal) and social pressure (impersonal,
diffuse, indeterminate, and lacking design or conscious direction to achieve
certain intended ends) there is, as the drawers of the distinction concede, the
exceptional situation where social pressure "may be exploited . .. to achieve
certain intended ends of conformity."11 2 This is the very situation presented by
the indirect religious coercion cases. The state is taking advantage of social or
peer pressure to attain its goal. 13
B. Under-Inclusive Coverage
Critics of the exclusive use of a direct religious coercion test only contend
that this approach is too narrow and disturbingly under-inclusive in its
coverage. 114 Gey argues:
[T]he narrow definition of coercion imposes almost no limit whatsoever on
government-sponsored religious activity. Adopting this version of the coercion
standard would rob the Establishment Clause of almost all its power....
Justice Scalia's "legal coercion" standard is unpalatable even to many
advocates of coercion theory, for the obvious reason that the "legal coercion"
standard in effect would convert the government into a subsidiary of the
majority's religious faith which would seriously inhibit the religious liberty of
everyone else in society.
Gey rightly points to a case like Doe v. Duncanville Independent School
District' as a troubling example of what social pressure can do.
Duncanville, Texas, is described in its official city government website as
"A Warm Community of Friends" and "A Wonderful Place to Raise a
Family."' The following events suggest that this self-description may not
111. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 96, at 372.
112. McCloskey, supra note 9, at 339.
113. Or, social pressure being used in "an instrumentalized fashion" by the state.
ROSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 38.
114. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 90.
115. Gey, supra note 61, at 493, 533.
116. 994 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1993).
117. CiTY OF DUNCANVILLE, TEx. (July 18, 2011), http://www.ci.duncanville.tx.us (last
visited May 21, 2012).
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have always been so. Jane Doe was a twelve-year-old girl who made the girls
basketball team at Reed Junior High, Duncanville." 8 The coach of the team
regularly began or ended a game with a team recitation of the Lord's Prayer. 119
Even though Doe was "uncomfortable with these prayers," she joined in "out of
a desire not to create dissension."1 20 Doe's father, upon learning his daughter
did not like participating in these prayers, took the matter up with the school
authorities-but to no avail.121 Thereafter, Doe was regularly required to stand
apart from the team during subsequent prayers.122
The record shows that her fellow students asked, "Aren't you a Christian?"
and one spectator stood up after a game and yelled, "Well, why isn't she
praying? Isn't she a Christian?" Additionally, Doe's history teacher called her
"a little atheist" during one class lecture.123
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the basketball prayers were
unconstitutional, largely based on the fact that the coach, a school official,
chose and led the prayer.124 Had, as Gey hypothesized, the school required the
coach to not participate in the prayers and permitted the students to decide
whether to pray voluntarily, it is likely that the student body would have voted
to continue the practice.125 Would the outcome have been any different?
In fact an event similar to the hypothetical Gey postulated did occur
subsequently. As we have seen, in Santa Fe the Supreme Court held that a
student-led, student-initiated, Christian invocation said over the public address
system by a student prior to football games at Santa Fe High School, a public
school in southern Texas, was in violation of the Establishment Clause.126 The
interposition of a two-step student election process-whereby students voted
first on whether to have an invocation and, secondly, who should deliver it-as
a "circuit-breaker" mechanism did not eradicate the coercive element of the
final message and thus did not immunize the practice from constitutional
challenge.127 In addition, it was still government and not private speech.128
IV. AN ASSESSMENT
There is considerable merit in the indirect religious coercion approach, in
that it does take account of the social and psychological pressures that may
118. 994 F.2d 160, 161 (5th Cir. 1993).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 162.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 162-63.
124. Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1993).
125. Gey, supra note 61, at 525-56.
126. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313-17 (2000).
127. Id. at 310.
128. Id. at 302, 309.
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practically force a person to comply with some religious activity. As the Court
in Lee v. Weisman noted,129 and subsequent studies continue to affirm, research
in psychology does support the everyday intuition that peer and social influence
has a demonstrable conformity-inducing effect upon adolescents.1 30 The notion,
however, is not without difficulties, both conceptual and practical. Broadly
speaking, do the "costs" of adopting an indirect religious coercion approach
outweigh the "benefits"?
First, in terms of the "costs", the indirect religious coercion approach calls
for subjective and imprecise evaluations of intangible phenomena-peer and
social pressure, alienation, stigmatization, and ostracism. Clearly, however,
some judges believe they are capable of undertaking such evaluations. Many
areas of the law have long called for the courts to engage in subjective and
imprecise assessments. For instance, determining the quantum of compensatory
damages for loss of reputation is difficult. The determination of whether a
merger will result in a substantial lessening of competition in a market is
likewise a challenging exercise. Granted, religious coercion is a "manipulable"
label, as Justice Scalia dubbed it.' 3 ' It is certainly not, however, the only one to
be found in the law. Unconscionable conduct in contract law and exclusionary,
monopolizing conduct in antitrust law are just two examples.132
Secondly, a finding of indirect religious coercion is somewhat
unpredictable. There is the oft-heard accusation that it is simply a matter of "I
know it when I see it." 33 But is ex ante certainty as important a virtue here as it
is in commercial law? Is religious freedom law perhaps more like family law
where, arguably, ex ante certainty is less important? Flexibility and
individualized justice are paramount in family and child law and thus
amorphous standards such as the "best interests" test are acceptable.'34
A third "cost" is that indirect religious coercion has the potential to
expunge religious symbolism from the public square. I have placed this third
129. 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992).
130. For recent studies see, e.g., Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age
Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531 (2007);
Vladas Griskevicius et al., Going Along Versus Going Alone: When Fundamental Motives
Facilitate Strategic (Non)Conformity, 91 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 281 (2006);
Leslie M. Janes & James M. Olson, Jeer Pressure: The Behavioral Effects of Observing
Ridicule of Others, 26 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 474 (2000).
131. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., Paul Bennett Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of
Unconscionability, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 187 (2005-2006) (discussing unconscionable
contracts); Einer R. Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV.
253 (2003) (discussing exclusionary, monopolizing conduct).
133. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to
the difficulty of defining "hard-core pornography"). See generally, Paul Gerwitz, On 'I
Know it When I See it, 105 YALE L.J. 1023 (1996) (discussing Justice Stewart's famous
phrase and its normative significance in non-rational judicial decision making).
134. See Carl Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and UMDA's Best-
Interest Standard, 89 MicH. L. REv. 2215 (1991).
Aug. 2012] 233
HeinOnline  -- 8 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 233 2012
234 STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES [VIII:2
cost in quotation marks, since the merits of the extirpation of religious displays
in the public sphere, and the removal of voluntary religious prayers in state
institutions such as schools, is a highly contentious matter.' It depends on
one's political and religious outlook.
Fourthly, is not some indirect religious coercion-subtle social or peer
pressures to conform, grudging compliance to avert embarrassment or stigma-
simply a fact of life in modem pluralistic democracies? Is some offense to at
least some persons not an inevitable by-product of contemporary social life,
where an increasing range of diverse cultures and religions live cheek-by-jowl
in cramped urban confines? Justice O'Connor in Elk Grove observed:
Any coercion that persuades an onlooker to participate in an act of
ceremonial deism is inconsequential, as an Establishment Clause matter,
because such acts are simply not religious in character. . . . That is not to say,
however, that government could overtly coerce a person to participate in an
act of ceremonial deism. . . . The compulsion of which Justice Jackson [in
West Virginia Bd Of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)] was concerned,
however, was of the direct sort-the Constitution does not guarantee citizens
a right entirely to avoid ideas with which they disagree. It would betray its
own principles if it did; no robust democracy insulates its citizens from views
that they might find novel or even inflammatory. 136
Fifthly, and paradoxically, does history not show that religious pressure
and testing may produce beneficial effects for adherents of minority faiths by
reinforcing their religious convictions? Although it may seem unpleasant, 137 the
testing of one's religious commitments through peer or social pressure may
bolster that faith.
Finally, why should there be a sort of "religious dissenter's veto" akin to
the so-called "heckler's veto"? The majority in Lee v. Weisman was not
unaware of these points:
We do not hold that every state action implicating religion is invalid if one or
a few citizens find it offensive. People may take offense at all manner of
religious as well as nonreligious messages, but offense alone does not in
every case show a violation. We know too that sometimes to endure social
isolation or even anger may be the price of conscience or nonconformity.
But ... the conformity required of the student in this case was too high an
135. See AHDAR & LEIGH, supra note 12, chap. 5; Laycock, supra note 74. The debate
over the placement of the ground zero seventeen-foot steel beam "cross" in a public museum
devoted to the 9/11 attack is just one of the more prominent socio-religious issues that
regularly evoke controversy. See Elissa Gootman, Atheists Sue to Block Display of Cross-
Shaped Trade Center Beam in 9/11 Museum, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2011, at A20.
136. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). See also Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 727 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he
Establishment Clause does not shield citizens from encountering the beliefs or symbols of
any faith to which they do not subscribe.").
137. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Peer pressure, unpleasant as
it may be, is not coercion.").
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exaction to withstand the test of the Establishment Clause. 138
Clearly, reasonable people can disagree on what constitutes "too high an
exaction." Chief Justice Rehnquist in Elk Grove decried the notion that the
court should affirm a sort of religious version of the heckler's veto.' 39 Mr.
Newdow might sincerely disagree with the "under God" part of the Pledge, but
that did not give him "a veto power" over the "democratic choices made by
public bodies" that willing participants should participate in a daily patriotic
recitation. 140 This case perhaps points to an unarticulated factor at work here.141
Religious activities that seem to lack little claim to governmental support might
be invalidated even if a small amount of indirect coercion is present. By
contrast, if there seems to be a good reason for the government practice (for
example, engendering community solidarity and patriotism by saying a pledge)
a greater amount of pressure is allowed and the "exaction" is not "too high."
On balance I believe that a case can be made for adoption of the indirect
religious coercion approach. As with so many issues, it is not an all-or-nothing
choice. There is more to consider than the stark alternatives of rejecting the
concept entirely or accepting an open-ended version of it.
V. A MODIFIED INDIRECT RELIGIOUS COERCION TEST
Instead of an open-ended test of indirect religious coercion, I propose a
modified or truncated two-stage test of indirect religious coercion.142 The
object is to capture the benefits of taking into account the practical social
pressure that majoritarian religionists exert upon adherents of religious
minorities and other dissenters, whilst streamlining the inquiry to give it a
greater measure of administrability and predictability.
The first step is to restrict the availability of the test. Because coercion is
open-textured, greater certainty can only be achieved by more fully specifying
its variable terms. 143 One could limit the pool of potential claims by focusing
on the type and nature of the complainant (the coerced person), the perpetrator
(the coercer), the factual setting, the coercion and so on. The plaintiff should
have the burden of showing he or she is in the protected class, and that the
preconditions to a viable claim have been met.
Having refined the situations where a claimant can plead indirect religious
coercion, the second stage comprises a mixture of burdens of proof and
presumptions, whereby the defendant has the opportunity to show that the
138. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597-98 (1992).
139. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 32 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. I am most grateful to Steve Smith for this insight.
142. For other tests, see, e.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v.
Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 373 F.3d 589, 598 (4th Cir. 2004) (specifying a test that
considers, first, the context and, second, the character of the allegedly coercive activity).
143. See Westen, supra note 6, at 589-90.
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practice is legitimate in the circumstances.
A. Stage One: The Preconditions
There are three preconditions to a successful claim that the complainant
must satisfy: there must be government conduct not private action, there must
be indirect coercion, and the coercion must be religious in nature.144
I have limited these prerequisites to three. One could extend the
requirements further to stipulate the nature of the context or factual situation in
which the coercion must occur or the nature of the victim of the indirect
coercive pressure. I have rejected these additional conditions. Regarding the
factual context, there seems no valid reason why we should restrict the
availability of a claim to, for example, closely regulated environments such as
schools, the military or prisons. Indirect coercion pressure may occur outside
these environments at places such as town meetings. Secondly, there is no
convincing reason why the coerced person should be limited to those especially
vulnerable to peer pressure such as children. Adults could avail themselves of
constitutional protection also, although the assessment of the susceptibility to
pressure will take into account the age and maturity of the complainant.145 1
turn now to the three prerequisites.
1. Government Action
First, the complainant must show that the state has acted.146 This in turn
raises the question of a causal nexus. As Cynthia Ward rightly comments, "The
problem of setting limits to indirect coercion is really one of connecting the
state's behavior to the feared harm in a way that justifies barring the state from
a challenged religious activity." 47 Usually this causation exercise will be
straightforward but sometimes it is not so clear-cut.
In Lee v. Weisman the Court divided on whether there was state action.
Justice Scalia, for the minority, remarked he found it "difficult to fathom" how
the state was involved and how the rabbi who delivered the graduation prayers
could be said to be "a mouthpiece of the school officials"148 when the school
144. 1 draw here from the three-step inquiry in Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th
Cir. 1996).
145. See, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 372 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
daily dinner prayer at the Virginia Military Institute, a state-operated military college,
violated the religious freedom of the two plaintiffs, adult cadets. The "technical
'voluntariness"' of the prayer did not immunize it and it "exact[ed] an unconstitutional toll
on the consciences of religious objectors."). See also Elizabeth Halligan, Coercing Adults?:
The Fourth Circuit and the Acceptability of Religious Expression in Government Settings, 57
S.C. L. REV. 923 (2006).
146. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479.
147. Ward, supra note 15, at 1649.
148. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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did not draft or screen the prayers. The majority, however, was clear that this
was a "state-sponsored" and "state-directed" religious activity.149 A state
official, the pubic school principal, determined that a prayer should be said and
"this [was] a choice attributable to the State, and from a constitutional
perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must occur." 5 0 The
principal chose the rabbi and issued guidelines on an inclusive prayer suitable
for this occasion and this sufficed to connect the state to the impugned
conduct. 1
Attempts to insulate the government from challenge and sever or "short-
circuit" the link between it and the impugned conduct are possible. But, if the
Santa Fe case is anything to go by, these efforts will be scrutinized stringently.
As noted earlier, the attempted "circuit-breaker mechanism" failed in that
case.152 The school held a two-fold election where students voted whether to
have a pre-game prayer and, if so, who the speaker would be. 5 3 The Texas
school district argued this case was distinguishable from Lee: that there was no
impermissible government coercion since the pre-game messages were the
product of student choice; they were private not public speech.154 The majority
disagreed: "Although it is true that the ultimate choice of student speaker is
'attributable to the students' . . . the District's decision to hold the
constitutionally problematic election is clearly 'a choice attributable to the
State.'" 5 5 The majority held that to empower the student body majority (via an
election) "with the authority to subject students of minority [religious] views to
constitutionally improper messages" 56 (namely, prayers) was impermissible.
"The award of that power alone, regardless of the students' ultimate use of it, is
not acceptable." 5 7
2. Indirect Coercion
The coerced person must establish that indirect religious coercion was
exercised. The claimant must show he or she was confronted with a state-
created choice between a religious activity and a non-religious one and that the
presence of peer or social pressure by private citizens operated to ensure the
religious option was the only realistic or practical choice open to him or her. To
149. Id. at 586-87 (majority opinion).
150. Id. at 587.
151. Id. at 587-88.
152. Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 302.
155. Id. at 311.
156. Id. at 316.
157. Id. However the dissent disagreed strongly on this issue, see id. at 321-24
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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fulfill the causation requirement, the negative social sanction must either be
intended by the state or be a "reasonably foreseeable consequence", 58 of
requiring the persons coerced to make the choice set before them.
3. Religious Activity
The object of the government coercion must be "religious" and not
secular.159 Again this may or may not be straightforward.160 Defining
"religion" or "religious" activity is difficult.'61 A full discussion is beyond the
scope of this article but in brief I favor the approach taken by Judge Arlins
Adams of the Third Circuit.162 His definition-by-analogy approach utilizes
three indicia. A religion "addresses fundamental and ultimate questions," is
"comprehensive in nature" and is characterized by "the presence of certain
formal and external signs."163
The recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance by children in public schools
might, due to the presence of the words "under God," be characterized as a
religious exercise, akin to the saying of a prayer. The majority of the Supreme
Court in Elk Grove rejected this argument: "Reciting the Pledge, or listening to
others recite it, is a patriotic exercise, not a religious one; participants promise
fidelity to our flag and our Nation, not to any particular God, faith, or
church."l 64 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, while conceding
that it would be demeaning to religious people to say that the phrase "under
158. 1 adopt the approach of Ward, supra note 15, at 1653-54, 1660.
159. Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Ward, supra note 15, at
1655-59.
160. Is a public elementary school that directs its pupils to take home-along with a
host of pamphlets, circulars and newsletters-a flyer inviting parents to give permission to
their child to attend a school Christian club coercing its students' participation in a religious
activity? The answer of the majority of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was "no." Child
Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 373 F.3d 589 (4th Cir.
2004). See also Rebecca Hardberger, Coercion, Misperception and Excessive Entanglement
with Religion: A Reexamination of Child Evangelism Fellowship of Maryland, Inc. v
Montgomery County Public Schools (2006) 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1941.
161. For the complexities involved, see, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A
Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1989); KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION & THE CONSTITUTION 124-56 (Vol. 1, 2006); AHDAR & LEIGH,
supra note 12, at 110-125.
162. See Mainak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
908 (1982); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1033-35 (3d Cir. 1981).
163. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032.
164. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., v Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 31 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). See also id. at 44 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Any coercion that persuades an
onlooker to participate in an act of ceremonial deism [such as the Pledge] is inconsequential,
as an Establishment Clause matter, because such acts are simply not religious in character.").
But see id. at 48 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that even if the Pledge was not a prayer, it
still entailed "an affirmation that God exists" and presented a "constitutional problem[]"
since "the government cannot require a person to 'declare his belief in God."').
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God" lacked religious significance, nonetheless held that the words did not alter
the nature of the Pledge as a patriotic exercise. Most recently, the Ninth
Circuit majority affirmed this view in the latest round of the Elk Grove
litigation.166
By contrast, in Kerr v. Farrey, an example of direct religious coercion
discussed above, one of the issues was whether the substance-abuse
rehabilitation program the inmate was coerced to attend, Narcotics
Anonymous, was a religious one.167 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that AA-style, twelve-step program was religious.168 The steps-
"We made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as
we understood Him"; "[w]e admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another
human being the exact nature of our wrongs" and so on 69-were clearly
"based on the monotheistic idea of a single God or Supreme Being." 7 0 The
District Court was incorrect in holding that the concept of God could include
the non-religious idea of individual will power and hence the program was not
inevitably a religious one.1 ' The meetings the inmate Kerr attended were
"permeated with explicit religious content" 72 such as prayers invoking the
Lord. This was not a case like Pledge of Allegiance where the only religious
note struck was a couple of words "or other incidental references."l73
B. Stage Two: The Rebuttable Presumption
Once the claimant has satisfied the court that he or she is within the
protected class and that the three preconditions are met-there is state action
that coerced the complainant into a religious activity-a prima facie case is
established. I propose that upon fulfillment of the prerequisites, a rebuttable
presumption 74 arise that indirect religious coercion was exercised in violation
165. Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 407-08 (4th Cir. 2005).
166. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010).
167. 95 F.3d 472, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1996).
168. Id. at 480.
169. The twelve steps are quoted in full in Kerr, 95 F.3d at 474.
170. Id. at 480.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.; accord, Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2007).
174. The presumption against religious coercion derives from the presumption against
coercion generally. "[A]lthough coercion is not always wrong (quite obviously: one coerces
the small child not to run across the highway, or the murderer to drop his weapon), there is a
presumption against it. . . What can be concluded at the moral level is that we have a prima
facie obligation not to employ coercion." Virginia Held, Coercion and Coercive Offers, in
NOMOS XIV: COERCION, supra note 4, at 61-62. See also Robert Paul Wolff, Is Coercion
'Ethically Neutral'?, in NOMOS XIV: COERCION, supra note 4, at 145-46 ("But why seek to
eliminate, or at least to minimize coercion if it is not intrinsically evil? . . . Presumably
because coercion is not morally neutral (as persuasion perhaps is) but morally evil, and
hence requires justification. . . .The real reason [coercion is intrinsically evil] is quite simply
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of the religious freedom of the complainant.
The defendant coercer has the opportunity to escape constitutional
infringement. The onus is upon the coercer to show either: (a) that the effect
upon the claimant is de minimis, or, failing that, (b) that the defendant has taken
all feasible steps to avert the subtle coercive pressure upon the claimant. If the
defendant can do neither then the practice is prima facie in violation of the
relevant provision safeguarding the right of religious freedom.
The de minimis defense is not an easy one for defendants to satisfy for the
reasons discussed above. It is all too easy to dismiss the response of members
of minority religions, atheists, and other dissenters from the majoritarian faith.
The test, as I devise it, is individualized and subjective. It is not how a
reasonable person would feel and whether that person would succumb to the
pressure of the situation and choose religious conformity. It is how the actual
complainant, typically a member of a religious minority, would respond. There
is an objective gloss here though. Where the actual complainant's reaction is
idiosyncratic and is one that no reasonable person clothed with the coerced
person's attributes of age, religion and so on, would take, the claim ought to be
given little or no weight. If an adult atheist or Buddhist at a university
graduation ceremony felt alienated and stigmatized by a theistic prayer and felt
compelled to join in, his or her claim may not be accorded much weight where
the evidence showed there was ample opportunity to exit the venue without
embarrassment. Take Tanford v. Brand.M The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found there was no constitutional violation. The complainants, a law
school professor, two law students, and an undergraduate student, were firstly,
free to stay and listen to the invocation and benediction at the Indiana
University graduation ceremony (an impersonal gathering of some 30,000
people) or, secondly, as many staff and students chose to do, to not attend the
morning ceremony (which included the prayer) but the afternoon one (which
did not have a prayer) or, thirdly, to seamlessly exit the morning ceremony to
avoid listening to the prayers.176 The advancement of religion or entanglement
of government concluded the Court-and I would equally add, the prospect of
any real coercive effect-was "de minimis at best."l 77
If the de minimis defense fails, the defendant may still point to the fact it
has taken all feasible steps to avert coercive pressure. Obviously an excusal or
exemption mechanism is required. But, as the cases make abundantly clear, that
may not be sufficient. The opt-out mechanism must be designed so that the
embarrassment or stigma is negligible, if not non-existent. The fact that careful
consultation with the affected persons has taken place regarding measures to
that coercion is degrading. To coerce a man rather than persuade him is to treat him as a
thing governed by causes rather than as a person guided by reasons.").
175. 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997).
176. Id. at 985.
177. Id. at 986.
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minimize embarrassment would assist the defendant in this respect. Of course,
there may be no compromise possible and, from the coerced person's
viewpoint, nothing short of cessation of the activity may suffice. But the duty
to eliminate coercion is not absolute and, under my formulation, the steps taken
to offset any coercive pressure must be all those which are "feasible."
An example of the appropriate exculpatory measures is Kaplan v. City of
Chicago.17 8 A police officer complained she had been coerced by having to
attend community policing meetings ("beat meetings") at which the function
opened and closed with a Christian prayer.179 Her direct superior expressly told
her she was free to excuse herself from the meetings during the prayer, that it
would not be held against her and that if anyone challenged her for absenting
herself he would tell that person that attendance at prayer by police officers was
not required. He also offered to change her roster so she would no longer be in
the pool of officers possibly assigned to beat meetings.' 80 The court found there
was no coercion on these facts, and the fact that she might incur some
embarrassment or feel conspicuous in excusing herself did not give rise to a
constitutional violation.'8 '
CONCLUSION
Coercion is a "vice word[]" and an open-textured concept.182 While most
judge coercion to be bad,183 coercion can be a purely descriptive and morally
neutral term that describes the situation where the pressure exercised by the
coercer has in fact left the coercee in a worse position than she otherwise
desired to be. It can also be a normative or prescriptive term denoting the
situation where the pressure by the coercer has left the coerced person in a
worse position than she ought to be.184 It is too easy, as Westen points out, to
conflate the descriptive and normative.iss In religious freedom law this tends to
happen: religious coercion has occurred, therefore a constitutional violation has
178. No. 05-C-2001, 2009 WL 804066, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2009)
179. Id. at *2.
180. Id. The plaintiff also failed to establish there had been "state action," because the
prayers at beat meetings were not at the direction of the Chicago Police Department, they
were not led by CPD officers, and the prayers were not listed the meeting's agenda. Id. at *3.
18 1. Id.
182. Westen, supra note 6, at 543, 547.
183. Not everyone agrees, see, e.g., Westen, supra note 6, at 548; McCloskey, supra
note 9, at 349 (arguing "[i]n fact, it is unprofitable to speak in the abstract about the evilness
or otherwise of coercion. Society cannot exist, let alone function well, without the use of
coercion at many levels, institutional and personal. It is an essential tool for social life.");
Samuel Dubois Cook, Coercion and Social Change, in NOMOS XIV: COERCION, supra note
4, 107 at 126 (maintaining that "[c]oercion of the human will is intrinsically neither good nor
evil.").
184. Westen, supra note 6, at 590.
185. Id. at 544-48, 590-93.
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transpired. Yet, "[w]hether an institution exercises coercive force is a matter
empirically ascertainable and logically distinct from whether its exercise of
coercive force is morally defensible."' 86 The danger of conflating the
descriptive and prescriptive is that, having conducted the factual exercise of
identifying the exercise of religious coercion, we neglect the further and
distinct task of determining whether this particular instance is justifiable in
these circumstances.1 87 My proposal starts with the presumption that religious
coercion is bad, but does not rest there, for it allows the coercer to make a case
that this instance is nonetheless justified.
To recap, there are two broad concepts of religious coercion, one narrow
and the other broad. Direct religious coercion, the express and direct imposition
by the state of penalties for failure to comply with some religious exercise is
wrong. It clearly violates religious freedom. It is the second, broader concept
that is controversial. Indirect religious coercion denotes situations where the
state makes use of subtle social or peer pressures from private persons to
achieve conformity to some religious objective. The state creates or
orchestrates a situation where the person has a theoretical choice to decline to
engage in a particular religious activity, but the social and psychological
constraints make compliance well nigh certain.
I have argued that the indirect religious coercion theory is a useful addition
to the religious freedom jurisprudence. It addresses some of the very real and
complex dynamics of religious and group behavior. Nonetheless, it is, like
many things in life and human society, a subtle and complex phenomenon that
does not easily translate into a workable legal doctrine. Rather than jettison the
concept entirely, as some are wont to do, I have put forward a modified indirect
coercion test in an attempt to focus the analysis, identify the key criteria and
make the test more manageable and transparent.
In stage one, the complainant must satisfy three conditions before his or
her claim of violation of religious freedom may proceed. First, there must be
government and not private action. Second, there must, obviously enough, be
indirect coercion exercised. The claimant must be confronted with a state-
mandated choice to conform or not to conform to a particular religious activity,
and the prevailing social or peer pressures must render the religious option the
only practical or real one. Third, the activity must be a religious and not a
secular one.
If these preconditions are met, a rebuttable presumption arises that indirect
coercion was exercised in breach of the claimant's religious liberty. The second
stage enables the coercer to rebut the presumption. First, the coercer may
endeavor to show that the infringement was a de minimis breach: the coercive
effect is so attenuated and mild that no religious dissenter or person with the
same attributes to the claimant's would succumb to the pressure and join in the
186. Reidy & Riker, supra note 4, at 6-7.
187. Westen, supra note 6, at 593.
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religious practice. If that fails, the defendant may show that it has taken all
feasible steps to avert coercive pressure and ensure that the claimant's choice
was really voluntary.
"The multitude," said de Tocqueville, "require no laws to coerce those who
do not think like themselves: public disapprobation is enough."188 Social and
peer pressure to effect religious conformity is real and is deleterious. We can
ignore it but the challenge is to construct a workable law to sensibly regulate its
most egregious and conscience-impeding forms.
188. ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 261 (Knopf 1994) (1835).
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